Berlin's Block on the Sale of Fighter Jets to Türkiye (Eurofighter Typhoon)

Berlin’s decision to block the sale of 40 Eurofighter Typhoon jets to Türkiye, announced only weeks after the controversial arrest of Istanbul’s opposition mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, has detonated a three‑way crisis: inside Germany’s new “values‑based” foreign‑policy experiment, inside NATO’s already strained cohesion, and inside Europe’s own quest for a common defence market.

What follows is a critical tour of the fallout, told through five lenses that all converge on a single question: can Europe defend both its principles and its security when those principles clash with the policies of a pivotal ally?

Why The Eurofighters So Important:

Türkiye’s air force is living off an ageing fleet of 240 F‑16C/Ds, most delivered before smartphones existed. Athens, meanwhile, now fields Rafales and upgraded F‑16V Vipers. Ankara’s plan to buy 20 early‑build Typhoons from London and 20 state‑of‑the‑art Tranche 4 aircraft from the Eurofighter consortium would have restored a semblance of parity especially with the Meteor BVRAAM and Paveway IV precision kit the Typhoon can carry.

Excluding Türkiye from the F‑35 programme in 2019 over its S‑400 deal left a stealth‑capability chasm that the KAAN (Türkiye’s indigenous 5th‑gen fighter) will not fill before the early 2030s. Defence Minister Yaşar Güler calls the Eurofighter purchase the “bridge” that keeps Turkish deterrence credible until KAAN squads go operational. Berlin just kicked away half that bridge.

Political context:

On 19 March 2025, Turkish prosecutors detained İmamoğlu on corruption and terrorism charges. Critics call it corrupt using pliant courts to erase an electoral rival before the 2028 presidential race. The symbolism could hardly be clearer, Istanbul alone generates nearly one‑third of Türkiye’s GDP, and the mayor who beat Erdoğan’s party twice now sits behind bars.

Germany, long Türkiye’s biggest EU critic on rights issues, chose this moment to redraw its own red lines. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock declared İmamoğlu’s detention “a systemic assault on democratic norms”, then linked that assault to the EU’s 2008 arms‑export guidelines, effectively slamming the Typhoon hangar doors shut.

Behind the lofty language lies brutal coalition arithmetic. The SPD needs to prove its human‑rights bona fides to left‑leaning voters; the Greens, though outside government, have enough seats to tank climate bills if their ethical demands are ignored. Bavarian conservatives warn of lost Airbus jobs, defence‑industry lobbyists plead for predictability, and security hawks fear pushing Türkiye toward Moscow.

The result: a grand coalition that looks anything but, muddling through with a “veto first, debate later” reflex that satisfies moralists in Berlin and Paris but also confirms every Turkish suspicion that Europe uses double standards when it suits domestic politics.

Eurofighter is already fighting for relevance against France’s export‑savvy Rafale and the omnipresent F‑35. Every additional order funds the Long‑Term Evolution upgrade that keeps the jet competitive. Germany’s veto therefore hurts not only Türkiye, but also Spain, Italy, and the UK partners who signed a framework agreement requiring unanimous export approval back in 1998.

Airbus executives warn that if any one capital can pull the handbrake for political reasons, future clients will opt for French or American hardware, where the licence procedures even if stringent at least arrive with a clear roadmap rather than a last‑minute cliff‑edge.

Continuation:

Türkiye hosts Incirlik Air Base, stores U.S. tactical nuclear bombs under NATO’s nuclear‑sharing scheme, and commands Black Sea maritime patrols that bottle up Russia’s navy. Losing Turkish access or even seeing Ankara drift toward Russian or Chinese jets would cripple alliance interoperability built over decades.

Turkish officials have already floated limiting allied flight‑plans through their airspace. The mere threat underscores how fragile the post‑Cold‑War security bargain has become: democratic slippage in one ally triggers moral pushback in another, which in turn feeds Kremlin talking points about Western hypocrisy and “unreliable” partners.

Türkiye's Plan B's

Su‑35 / Su‑57 (Russia)	Immediate availability; political signalling	CAATSA sanctions; logistics dependency; further alienation from NATO
JF‑17 Block III (China‑Pakistan)	Lower cost; AESA radar; co‑production options	Limited range/payload; untested against near‑peer adversaries
Life‑extension of F‑16 fleet	Existing infrastructure; minimal diplomatic blow‑back	Airframe fatigue; outpaced by Greek upgrades
Accelerate KAAN	Sovereign control; tech‑base development	Engine dependence on Rolls‑Royce; high technical risk; earliest IOC ~2030s

The EU’s 2008 Common Position already obliges members to deny arms licences when there is a “clear risk” of serious rights abuse. The real problem is consistency. France still sells Rafales to Egypt; Italy ships frigates to Qatar; Germany itself partially lifted its Saudi embargo last year. Selective morality breeds predictable backlash from capitals that feel singled out.

If Europe wants credibility, it needs a transparent union‑wide test, one that combines democratic metrics, sunset clauses, industrial offset funds, and a credible appeals process. Anything less and every one‑off veto becomes a case study in hypocrisy and an invitation for Moscow or Beijing to fill the vacuum.

Tur­ko­no­mics.net Perspective

We defend two principles:

1. Democracy and rule of law are non‑negotiable. Jailing political opponents corrodes Türkiye’s international standing and domestic social fabric alike.

2. Strategic deterrence cannot be an afterthought. Europe gains nothing by moral posturing that drives a key NATO member toward rival suppliers and then laments the loss of leverage.

Reconciling those imperatives requires more than slogans. The Eurofighter debacle should push the EU to craft an arms‑export regime that punishes democratic backsliding while offering a pathway back, plus tangible incentives to keep wavering allies anchored in Western supply chains. Otherwise this won’t be the last time values collide with security. Next time, the damage to the alliance could be irreversible.